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Abstract—Belief and vulnerability have been proposed re-
cently to quantify information ﬂow in security systems. Both
concepts stand as alternatives to the traditional approaches
founded on Shannon entropy and mutual information, which
were shown to provide inadequate security guarantees. In this
paper we unify the two concepts in one model so as to cope
with (potentially inaccurate) attackers’ extra knowledge. To
this end we propose a new metric based on vulnerability that
takes into account the adversary’s beliefs.
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I. I
Protecting sensitive and conﬁdential data is becoming in-
creasingly important in many ﬁelds of human activities, such
as electronic communication, auction, payment and voting.
Many protocols for protecting conﬁdential information have
been proposed in the literature. In recent years the frame-
works for reasoning, designing, and verifying these protocols
have considered probabilistic aspects and techniques for two
reasons. First, the data to be protected often range in do-
mains naturally subject to statistical considerations. Second
and more important, the protocols often use randomised
primitives to obfuscate the link between the information to
be protected and the observable outcomes. This is the case,
e.g., of the DCNets [8], Crowds [31], Onion Routing [37],
and Freenet [13].
From the formal point of view, the degree of protection is
the converse of the leakage, i.e. the amount of information
about the secrets that can be deduced from the observables.
Early approaches to information hiding in literature were
the so-called possibilistic approaches, in which the proba-
bilistic aspects were abstracted away and replaced by non-
determinism. Some examples of these approaches are those
based on epistemic logic [20], [36], on function views [22],
and on process calculi [32], [33]. Recently, however, it has
been recognised that the possibilistic view is too coarse, in
that it tends to consider as equivalent systems which have
very diﬀerent degrees of protection.
The probabilistic approaches are therefore becoming in-
creasingly more popular. At the beginning they were inves-
tigated mainly at their strongest form of protection, namely
to express the property that the observables reveal no (quan-
titative) information about the secrets (strong anonymity, no
interference) [2], [8], [20]. More recently, weaker notions of
protection have been considered, due to the fact that such
strong properties are almost never achievable in practice.
Still in the probabilistic framework, Rubin and Reiter have
proposed the concepts of possible innocence and of probable
innocence [31] as weak notions of anonymity protection
(see also [4] for a generalisation of the latter). These are,
however, still true-or-false properties. The need to express
in a quantitative way the degree of protection has then
lead naturally to explore suitable notions within the well-
established ﬁelds of Information Theory and of Statistics.
Concepts from Information Theory [16] have proved quite
useful in this domain. In particular, the notion of noisy chan-
nel has been used to model protocols for information-hiding,
and the ﬂow of information in programs. The idea is that the
input s ∈ S of the channel represents the information to be
kept secret, and the output o ∈ O represents the observable.
The noise of the channel is generated by the eﬀorts of
the protocol to hide the link between the secrets and the
observable, usually by means of randomised mechanisms.
Consequently, an input s may generate several diﬀerent
outputs o, according to a conditional probability distribution
p(o| s). These probabilities constitute the channel matrix C.
Similarly, for each output there may be several diﬀerent
corresponding inputs, according to the converse conditional
probability p(s|o) which is linked to the above by the
Bayes law: p(s|o) = p(o| s) p(s)/p(o). The probability p(s)
is the a priori probability of s, while p(s|o) is the a
posteriori probability of s, after we know that the output is o.
These probability distributions determine the entropy and the
conditional entropy of the input, respectively. They represent
the uncertainty about the input, before and after observing
the output. The diﬀerence between entropy and conditional
entropy is called the mutual information and expresses how
much information is carried by the channel, i.e. how much
uncertainty about the input we lose by observing the output
(i.e., equivalently, how much information about the input we
gain by observing the output).
Even though several notions of entropy have been pro-
posed in Information Theory, Shannon’s is by far the mostfamous of them, due to its relation with the channel’s rate,
i.e., the speed by which information can be transmitted ac-
curately on a channel. Consequently, there have been various
attempts to deﬁne the degree of protection by using concepts
based on Shannon entropy, notably mutual information [10],
[24], [25], [38] and the related notion of capacity, which is
the supremum of the mutual information over all possible
input distributions, and which therefore represents the worst
case from the point of view of security [5], [28], [29].
A reﬁnement of the above approaches came from the
ideas of integrating the notions of extra knowledge and
belief [14], [15], [19]. The idea is that the gain obtained by
looking at the output should be relative to the possible initial
knowledge or belief that an attacker may have about the
secret. For instance, assume that in a parliament composed
by m Labourists and n Conservatives, m members voted
against a proposal to remove minimum wages. Without
any additional knowledge it is reasonable to believe that
all Labourists voted against. If however we came to know
that exactly one Conservative voted against, then it is
more reasonable to believe that the most liberally-inclined
Conservative voted against, and the least liberally-inclined
Labourist voted in favour. In this case, the a posteriori belief
is likely to be much more accurate than the a priori one, and
the gain obtained using the knowledge about MPs’ relative
positioning on the left-to-right scale is much larger than
the one computed as diﬀerence of entropies. Consequently,
[15] proposes to deﬁne the protection of a system in terms
of the diﬀerence (expressed in terms of Kullback-Leibler
divergence) between the accuracy of the a posteriori belief
and the accuracy of the a priori one.
In recent work, however, Smith has shown that the con-
cepts based on Shannon entropy are not very suitable for
modelling the information leakage in the typical scenario of
protocol attacks, where the adversary attempts to guess the
value of the secret in one single try [34]. He gave an example
of two programs whose Shannon’s mutual information is
about the same, yet the probability of making the right
guess after having observed the output is much higher in
one program than in the other. In a subsequent paper [35],
Smith has proposed to deﬁne the leakage in terms of a notion
of mutual information based on R´ enyi min-entropy.
Recently in [21] the authors extended the vulnerability
model of [35] in the context of the Crowds protocol for
anonymous message posting to encompass the frequent sit-
uation where attackers have extra knowledge. They pointed
out that in Crowds the adversary indeed has extra informa-
tion (viz., the target servers) and assumed that she knows
the correlation between that and the secret (viz., the users’
preferences for servers). They proved that in such scenarios
anonymity is more diﬃcult to achieve.
In our opinion, a fundamental issue remains wide open:
the need to measure and account for the accuracy of the
adversary extra knowledge. Indeed, [21] assumes that the
adversary’s extra information is accurate, and this assump-
tion is generally not warranted. Inaccuracy can indeed arise,
e.g. from people giving deliberately wrong information,
or simply from outdated data. As already noticed in [15]
there is no reason in general to assume that the probability
distributions the attacker uses are correct, and therefore they
must be treated as beliefs.
This paper tries to ﬁll this gap by generalising the model
on R´ enyi min-entropy to cope with the presence of the
attacker’s beliefs. To this end we propose a new metric based
on the concept of vulnerability that takes into account the
adversary’s beliefs. The idea is that the attacker does not
know the actual probability distributions (i.e., the a priori
distribution of the protocol’s hidden input and its corre-
lation with the extra information), and is assuming them.
The belief-vulnerability is then the expected probability of
guessing the value of the hidden input in one try given
the adversary’s belief. Informally, the adversary chooses the
value of the secret input which has the maximum a posteriori
probability according to her belief. Then the vulnerability
of the secret input is expressed in terms of the actual a
posteriori probabilities of the adversary’s possible choices.
We show the strength of our deﬁnitions both in terms of
their theoretical properties and their utility by applying
them to various threat scenarios and comparing the results
to the previous approaches. Among its several advantages,
our model allows to identify the levels of accuracy for the
adversary’s beliefs which are compatible with the security
of a given program or protocol.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in §II
we ﬁx some basic notations and recall some fundamental
notions of Information Theory; in §III we brieﬂy revise
previous approaches to quantitative information follow; §IV
delivers our core technical contribution by extending the
model on R´ enyi min entropy to the case of attacker’s beliefs
and investigating its theoretical properties; in §V we apply
our approach to various threat scenarios and compare it to
the previous approaches whilst §VI contains our concluding
remarks.
II. P
In this section we brieﬂy revise the elements of Infor-
mation Theory which underpin the work in this paper, and
illustrate our conceptual framework.
A. Some notions of information theory
Being in a purely probabilistic setting gives us the ability
to use tools from information theory to reason about the
uncertainty of a random variable and the inaccuracy of
assuming a distribution for a random variable. In particular
we are interested in the following notions: entropy, mutual
information, relative entropy and min-entropy. We refer the
reader to [17], [27] for more details.We use capital letters X, Y to denote discrete random
variables and the corresponding small letters x, y and cal-
ligraphic letters X, Y for their values and set of values
respectively. We denote by p(x), p(y) the probability of x
and y respectively and by p(x,y) their joint probability.
Let X,Y be random variables. The (Shannon) entropy
H(X) of X is deﬁned as
H(X) = −
X
x∈X
p(x)log p(x). (1)
The entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable.
It takes its maximum value log|X| when X is uniformally
distributed and its minimum value 0 when X is a constant.
We take the logarithm with a base 2 and thus measure
entropy in bits. The conditional entropy
H(X|Y) = −
X
y∈Y
p(y)
X
x∈X
p(x|y)log p(x|y) (2)
measures the amount of uncertainty of X when Y is known.
It can be shown that 0 ≤ H(X|Y) ≤ H(X) with the leftmost
equality holding when Y completely determines the value
of X and the rightmost one when Y reveals no information
about X, i.e., X and Y are independent random variables.
Comparing H(X) and H(X|Y) give us the notion of mutual
information, denoted I(X;Y) and deﬁned by
I(X;Y) = H(X) − H(X|Y). (3)
It is non-negative, symmetric and bounded by H(X). In other
words 0 ≤ I(X;Y) = I(Y;X) ≤ H(X).
The relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler distance between
two probability distribution p and q on the same set X,
denoted D(p k q), is deﬁned as
D(p k q) =
X
x∈X
p(x)log
p(x)
q(x)
. (4)
It is non-negative (but not symmetric) and it is 0 if and only
if p = q. The relative entropy measures the inaccuracy or
information divergence of assuming that the distribution is
q when the true distribution is p.
The guessing entropy G(X) is the expected number of
tries required to guess the value of X optimally. The optimal
strategy is to guess the values of X in decreasing order of
probability. Thus if we assume that X = {x1, x2,..., xn} and
xi’s are arranged in decreasing order of probabilities, i.e.,
p(x1) ≥ p(x2) ≥ ··· ≥ q(xn), then
G(X) =
X
1≤i≤n
ip(xi). (5)
The min-entropy H∞(X) of a random variable is given by
H∞(X) = −logmax
x∈X
p(x) (6)
and measures the diﬃculty for an attacker to correctly guess
the value of X in one try (obviously using the optimal
strategy above). It can be shown that H∞(X) ≤ H(X) with
equality when X is uniformly distributed. In general, H(X)
can be arbitrary higher than H∞(X), since it can be arbitrary
high even if X assumes a given value with probability close
to 1.
B. Framework
In this paper we consider a framework similar to the
probabilistic approaches to anonymity and information ﬂow
used e.g. in [6], [20], [26], and [35]. We restrict ourselves to
total protocols and programs with one high level input A, a
random variable over a ﬁnite set A, and one low level output
(observable) O, a random variable over a ﬁnite set O. We
represent a protocol/program by the matrix of the conditional
probabilities p(oj |ai), where p(oj |ai) is the probability that
the low output is oj given that the high input is ai. An
adversary or eavesdropper can see the output of a protocol,
but not its input, and she is interested in deriving the value
of the input from the observed output in one single try.
In this paper we shall assume that the high input is gener-
ated according to an a priori probabilistic distribution pρ(ai)
unknown to the adversary, as explained in the introduction.
We also denote by pβ(ai) the adversary’s assumed a priori
distribution of A. Furthermore, we assume that the attacker
has access to the value of a random variable B distributed
over B which summarises the additional knowledge (infor-
mation) about A she has independently of the behaviour
of the protocol. The matrix of the conditional probabilities
pρ(bk |ai) (resp. pβ(bk |ai)) expresses the real (resp. the
adversary’s assumed) correlation between the hidden input
and the additional observables B. An adversary’s belief
then consists of the pair pβ(ai), pβ(bk |ai) of her assumed
probabilities.
When |B| = 1 and the a priori distribution is publicly-
known, i.e., pρ(ai) = pβ(ai), the adversary’s additional infor-
mation about A is trivial and cannot help to determine the
value of A. For example, knowing the length of a password
in a ﬁxed-length password system gives no advantage, as all
passwords have the same length. Trivial information allow
us to model the absence of additional information, and to
see the standard framework in the literature as an instance
of ours.
Example 1: Let A be a random variable with a publicly-
known uniform a priori distribution over A = {0,1,2,3}.
Assume that the adversary’s additional observable is the
parity of A, i.e. B = {0,1}, with the following deterministic
belief’s correlation pβ(bk |ai) = p(ai mod 2 = bk). In other
words, the adversary believes that her additional information
accurately reﬂects that the value of A is an even number if
B = 0 and odd otherwise.
Now suppose that A is the high input of the deterministic
program C1 below, whose low output is
O =
(
1 if a ∈ {0,1}
2 otherwise.p(o | a) o0 o1 o2
a0 1 − λ λ 0
a1 1 0 0
a2 λ 0 1 − λ
a3 1 0 0
Table I
C    PROG C2
PROG C1:
BEGIN
O := b log(A + 2) c
END
In the case of wrong belief, i.e., when the attacker believes
that the value of A is even (resp. odd) when it actually is
odd (resp. even), her low observation of PROG C1 does not
allow her to correct her belief. Indeed, both observations can
be induced by any number.
Now suppose that A is the high input of the probabilistic
program C2 below, with low output O ∈ {−1,0,2} and
conditional probabilistic matrix as in Table I.
PROG C2:
BEGIN
R ‘sampled from {0,2} with p(0) = λ and p(2) = 1 − λ’;
If A = R
Then O := A
Else O := −1
END
Contrary to the PROG C1, the low output of PROG C2 may
allow the adversary to correct her wrong belief. In particular
if B = 1 and O is either 0 or 2, then the adversary knows
that her belief is wrong. But the observation O = −1 cannot
help her to correct her wrong belief, as it is compatible with
both beliefs.
III. U  
This section reviews the existing deﬁnitions for quan-
tifying information leakage. We begin by quantitative ap-
proaches to information ﬂow based on Shannon entropy and
mutual information, and recall why they fail to give good
security guarantees. We then present an alternative approach
based on the adversary’s beliefs proposed by Clarkson,
Myers and Schneider [15]. We conclude the section by
presenting a more recent alternative approach based on the
concept of vulnerability introduced by Smith [35].
A. Shannon entropy approach
There seems to be a general consensus in the literature for
using Shannon entropy to measure uncertainty and mutual
information to quantify information leakage [6], [9], [11],
[12], [23]. We remind the reader that these approaches aim at
quantifying information ﬂow as a reduction of the adversary
uncertainty about the high input and take no account of
the adversary’s initial knowledge. Shannon entropy H(A)
as a measure of the uncertainty of A seems adequate to
express the adversary’s initial uncertainty about A. Similarly,
as the conditional entropy H(A|O) measures the amount of
uncertainty of A when O is known, it seems appropriate to
express the adversary’s remaining uncertainty. We thus have
the following deﬁnitions.
• initial uncertainty (IU): H(A)
• remaining uncertainty (RU): H(A|O)
• information leakage (IL): IU − RU = H(A) −
H(A|O) = I(A;O)
Nevertheless, recent work by Smith [35] suggests that
these notions do not support security guarantees satisfac-
torily. In particular the remaining uncertainty is generally of
little value in characterising the real threat that the adversary
could guess the value of A given her low observations. Smith
uses the following example to prove that.
Example 2: Consider the following programs C3 and C4,
where A is a uniformly distributed 8k-bit integer, k ≥ 2, &
denotes bitwise ‘AND’, and 07k−11k+1 a binary constant.
PROG C3:
BEGIN
If A mod 8 = 0
Then O := A
Else O := 1
END
PROG C4:
BEGIN
O := A & 07k−11k+1
END
PROG C3 reveals completely the high input when A is a
multiple of 8 while it reveals nothing about A otherwise
(except of course the very fact that it is not a multiple of 8).
On the contrary, PROG C4 reveals always and only the last
k + 1 bits of A.
According to the consensus deﬁnitions, we have IU = 8k,
RU = 7k − 0.169 and IL = k + 0.169 for PROG C3, and
IU = 8k, RU = 7k − 1 and IL = k + 1 for PROG C4 (the
reader is referred to [35] for the detailed calculations). So,
under such deﬁnitions, PROG C4 appears actually worse than
PROG C3, as 7k−1 < 7k−0.169, even though intuitively C3
leaves A highly vulnerable to being guessed (e.g., when it
is a multiple of 8) while C4 does not, at least for large k.
B. Belief approach
Recently Clarkson et al. [14], [15] showed that the
Shannon entropy approach is inadequate for measuring
information ﬂow when the adversary makes assumptions
about the high-level secret and such assumptions might be
incorrect. Based on the conviction that it is unavoidable that
the attacker makes such (potentially inaccurate) assumptions,
they proposed a new metric. They formalised the idea of
an adversary’s belief simply as a distribution of A assumed
by the adversary: information ﬂow is then expressed as anincrease of the accuracy of such belief. The initial accuracy
is the Kullback-Leibler distance between the adversary’s
initial belief and the actual distribution of A; similarly
the remaining accuracy is the Kullback-Leibler distance
between the Bayesian-updated belief of the adversary after
her low observation, and the actual distribution of A.
As already noticed by Smith [35], when the adversary’s
belief coincides with the a priori distribution of A, then the
belief approach reduces again to the inadequate standard
approach illustrated above.
C. Vulnerability approach
Having observed that both the consensus and the belief
approaches fail in general to give good security guarantees,
Smith [35] proposes a new metric for quantitative informa-
tion ﬂow based on the notions of vulnerability and min-
entropy. We brieﬂy revise these concepts here.
The vulnerability of a random variable A is the worse-
case probability that an adversary could guess the value of
A correctly in one try. The vulnerability of A, denoted V(A),
is thus formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1: V(A) = maxa∈A p(a).
The conditional vulnerability of a A given O measures the
expected probability of guessing A in one try given O. It is
denoted V(A|O) and deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2: V(A|O) =
P
o∈O p(o)V(A|o), where
V(A|o) is maxa∈A p(a|o).
The initial uncertainty about A is then deﬁned as the
negative logarithm of V(A), which turnouts to be the min-
entropy of the random variable A – cf. (6) above. And the
remaining uncertainty about A after observing O is deﬁned
as the min-entropy of A given O. Thus we have the following
vulnerability-based deﬁnitions:
• IU : H∞(A) = −logV(A)
• RU : H∞(A|O) = −logV(A|O)
• IL : IU − RU = H∞(A) − H∞(A|O)
Now on the security guarantees of the vulnerability-based
approach. By applying these deﬁnitions to the programs of
Example 2, we have IU = 8k, RU = 8k − 3 and IL = 3
for PROG C3, and IU = 8k, RU = 7k − 1 and IL = k + 1
for PROG C4. While these quantities remain the same as in
the consensus approach for PROG C4, the new metric hugely
increases the leakage ascribed to PROG C3 reﬂecting the fact
that the low observations of PROG C3 leave the high input
very vulnerable to being guessed.
A related line of research has explored methods of statisti-
cal inference, in particular those from the hypothesis testing
framework. The idea is that the adversary’s best guess is that
the true input is the one which has the maximum conditional
probability (MAP rule) and that, therefore, the a posteriori
vulnerability of the system is the complement of the Bayes
Risk, which is the average probability of making the wrong
guess when using the MAP rule [7]. This is always at least
as high as the a priori vulnerability, which is the probability
of making the right guess just based on the knowledge of the
input distribution. It turns out that Smith’s notion of leakage
actually corresponds to the ratio between the a posteriori and
the a priori vulnerabilities [3], [35].
Concerning the eﬃcient computation of the channel ma-
trix and the leakage, the only work we are aware of is [1],
in which the authors propose various automatic techniques.
One of these is able to generate counterexamples, namely
points on the execution where the channel exhibits an
excessive amount of leakage. This method is therefore also
useful to ﬁx unsound protocols.
IV. U B  V
We now propose an alternative approach based on the
vulnerability concept that takes into account the adversary’s
belief.
A. Belief-vulnerability
Let B be the adversary’s additional information about a
random high level variable A. Then the belief-vulnerability
of A is the expected probability of guessing A in one try
given the adversary’s belief. Given an additional information
B = b, the adversary will choose a value having the
maximal conditional probability according to her belief, that
is a value a0 ∈ Γb, where Γb = argmaxa∈A pβ(a|b). The
vulnerability of A given b is then the real probability that the
adversary’s choice is correct given b, that is the conditional
probability pρ(a0 |b). As there might be many values of A
with the maximal conditional probability, the attacker will
pick uniformly at random one element in Γb. Hence we have
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3: Let A be a random variable and B the
adversary’s extra knowledge about A. Then the belief-
vulnerability of A, denoted V(A : B), is deﬁned as
V(A : B) =
X
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A : b) (7)
where V(A : b) = 1
|Γb|
P
a0∈Γb pρ(a0 |b).
Next, we show how to compute V(A : B) from the given
probabilities.
V(A : B) =
X
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A : b)
=
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
 1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b)

=
X
b∈B
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b)pρ(b)
(by Bayes theorem)
=
X
b∈B
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(b|a)pρ(a).
Thus the belief-vulnerability can be easily computed as
follows.Proposition 1: Let A be a random variable and B the
adversary’s extra knowledge about A. Then
V(A : B) =
X
b∈B
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(b|a)pρ(a). (8)
We then deﬁne the initial uncertainty as the min-entropy
of A : B. Thus we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4: Let A be a random variable and B the
adversary’s additional information about A. Then the initial
threat to A given B, denoted H∞(A : B), is deﬁned as
H∞(A : B) = log
 1
V(A : B)

. (9)
Example 3: Suppose that A is uniformly distributed over
{0,1,2,3} and the adversary’s extra information is about the
parity of A. Assume that the a priori distribution of A is
publicly-known, i.e. ∀a ∈ A, pβ(a) = pρ(a). Assume also
that the adversary believes that her extra info is accurate,
that is she assumes the following correlation:
pβ(b | a) b0 b1
a0 1 0
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
a3 0 1
Then Γ0 = {0,2} and Γ1 = {1,3}. Thus
V(A : B) =
X
b∈B
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(b|a)pρ(a)
=
X
b∈{0,1}
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
1
4
pρ(b|a)
=
1
4
h 1
2
X
a∈Γ0
pρ(b0 | a)
+
1
2
X
a∈Γ1
pρ(b1 | a)
i
=
1
8
h
pρ(b0 | a0) + pρ(b0 | a2)
+ pρ(b1 | a1) + pρ(b1 | a3)
i
.
Table II summarizes the initial uncertainty about A when
the real correlation between the high level input and the
extra observables is pρ1(b | a), pρ2(b | a), pρ3(b | a), and
pρ4(b | a) respectively. The correlation pρ1(b | a) means
that the adversary’s extra information is slightly noisy:
when the high input is an even (resp. odd) number, the
extra observable is usually (with probability 0.98) even
(resp. odd). But with a small probability the adversary is
wrong as the parity is reversed. The contrary holds for the
second correlation pρ2(b | a), that is the correlation is highly
noisy. The third correlation is not a noisy one and coincide
with the adversary’s assumed one: the adversary’s belief is
therefore 100% accurate since we assumed that the actual a
pρ(b | a) pρ1 pρ2 pρ3 pρ4
V(A : B) 0.49 0.02 0.50 0
H∞(A : B) 1.03 5.56 1 +∞
pρ1(b | a) b0 b1
a0 0.98 0.02
a1 0.02 0.98
a2 0.98 0.02
a3 0.02 0.98
pρ2(b | a) b0 b1
a0 0.03 0.97
a1 0.98 0.02
a2 0.04 0.96
a3 0.94 0.08
pρ3(b | a) b0 b1
a0 1 0
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
a3 0 1
pρ4(b | a) b0 b1
a0 0 1
a1 1 0
a2 0 1
a3 1 0
Table II
I     
priori distribution of A is publicly-known. Finally, the last
correlation pρ4(b | a) always fools the attacker by reverting
the parity. Note that in this last case the adversary’s initial
uncertainty is inﬁnite. This means that it is impossible for
her to guess the value of the secret in one try when her
initial belief is 100% inaccurate.
More generally, let Beliefs(A, B) denote the set of adver-
sary’s beliefs about A according to the extra information B,
and let Beliefs⊥(A, B) be the set of totally inaccurate beliefs,
Beliefs⊥(A, B) =
n 
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)

∈ Beliefs(A, B) |
∀b ∈ B, a ∈ Γb implies pρ(a|b) = 0
o
Then the following result holds.
Proposition 2: Let A be a random variable and B the
adversary’s extra information about A. Let (pβ(a), pβ(b|a))
be the adversary’s belief, then
 
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)

∈ Beliefs⊥(A, B) implies H∞(A: B) = +∞.
Proof: Direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Deﬁ-
nition 4.
In order to avoid such inﬁnite values when computing
the reduction of uncertainty, we shall exclude 100% always
inaccurate beliefs. Thus we deﬁne admissible beliefs up to a
positive number  so that we can approximate 100% always
inaccurate beliefs by making  as close to zero as possible.
Deﬁnition 5: An adversary’s initial belief is -admissible
(0 <  ≤ 1) if the following holds.
∀b ∈ B, a ∈ Γb implies pρ(a|b) ≥ .
Beliefs(A, B) denotes the set of -admissible beliefs.
Note that in the above deﬁnition,  is a lower bound on the
probability that the adversary’s guess is correct. Note also
that if a belief is -admissible then it is also 0-admissible
for all 0 ≤ . Thus Beliefs(A, B) ⊆ Beliefs0(A, B).
Next we show that, contrary to information, belief may
actually hurt. Indeed, in the above example since A isuniformly (and publicly) distributed over {0,1,2,3} then
H∞(A) = 2. Hence H∞(A) > H∞(A : B) when ρ ∈ {ρ1,ρ3}
and H∞(A) < H∞(A : B) when ρ ∈ {ρ2,ρ4}. In particular, the
following two results hold.
Lemma 1: If ∀b ∈ B, a ∈ Γb implies pρ(b|a) ≤ 1
|B| then
H∞(A) ≤ H∞(A : B)
Proof:
V(A : B) =
X
b∈B
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(b|a)pρ(a)
≤
X
b∈B
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
1
|B|
pρ(a)
≤
X
b∈B
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
1
|B|
max
a∈A
pρ(a)
≤
X
b∈B
1
|Γb|
|Γb|
|B|
max
a∈A
pρ(a)
≤
1
|B|
X
b∈B
V(A)
≤
|B| V(A)
|B|
= V(A).
Hence H∞(A) ≤ H∞(A : B).
The next result states that a 100% accurate belief is
information and hence may only reduce the uncertainty
about A.
Lemma 2: If ∀b ∈ B, a ∈ Γb implies that pρ(b|a) =
maxa0∈A pρ(a0 |b), then
H∞(A : B) = H∞(A|B) ≤ H∞(A).
Proof:
V(A : B) =
X
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A : b)
=
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
 1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b)

=
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
 1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
max
a0∈A
pρ(a0 |b)

=
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
 1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
V(A|b)

=
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
 1
|Γb|
|Γb| V(A|b)

=
X
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A|b)
= V(A| B)
Hence H∞(A : B) = H∞(A|B) ≤ H∞(A).
We conclude this subsection by establishing both a lower
and an upper bounds of our initial uncertainty in term of
min-entropy. The following auxiliary deﬁnitions and results
serve this purpose.
Deﬁnition 6: An adversary’s initial belief is (at least) ω-
accurate (0 < ω ≤ 1), denoted
 
pβω(a), pβω(b|a)

if the
following holds.
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) ≥ ω · V(A|b).
In other words, an adversary’s belief is ω-accurate if
the belief-vulnerability of A is never oﬀ by more than a
factor ω from the real vulnerability of A given the additional
information. Similarly, we say that an adversary’s belief is
(ω)-accurate if it is exactly ω-accurate, i.e.,
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) = ω · V(A|b).
Fixed the actual probabilities pρ(a) and pρ(b|a), let us
consider the partial order  on Beliefs(A, B), such that  
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)


 
p0
β(a), p0
β(b|a)

if and only if
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) ≤
1
|Γ0
b|
X
a∈Γ0
b
pρ(a|b).
Then the following lemma states that (pβ1(a), pβ1(b|a)) is an
upper bound on Beliefs(A, B).
Lemma 3: For all
 
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)

in Beliefs(A, B) we
have
 
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)


 
pβ1(a), pβ1(b|a)

.
Proof: Follows easily from the deﬁnitions of  and  
pβ1(a), pβ1(b|a)

.
We now show that the uncertainty based on belief-
vulnerability decreases when the accuracy of the adversary’s
belief increase.
Lemma 4:
 
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)


 
p0
β(a), p0
β(b|a)

implies
H∞(A : B) ≥ H∞(A : B0).
Proof:
 
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)


 
p0
β(a), p0
β(b|a)

m
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) ≤
1
|Γ0
b|
X
a∈Γ0
b
pρ(a|b)
m
∀b ∈ B, pρ(b)
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) ≤ pρ(b)
1
|Γ0
b|
X
a∈Γ0
b
pρ(a|b)
m
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) ≤
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
1
|Γ0
b|
X
a∈Γ0
b
pρ(a|b)
m
V(A : B) ≤ V(A : B0).
Hence H∞(A : B) ≥ H∞(A : B0).
Now we show that a 1-accurate belief is also 100%
accurate.Lemma 5: An adversary’s belief is 1-accurate if and only
if
∀b ∈ B, ∀a ∈ Γb, pρ(a|b) = max
a0∈A
pρ(a0 |b).
Proof: An adversary’s belief is 1-accurate if and only
if
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) ≥ 1 · max
a0∈A
pρ(a0 |b). (10)
But
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) ≤ 1 · max
a0∈A
pρ(a0 |b)
since
∀b ∈ B, ∀a ∈ Γb, pρ(a|b) ≤ max
a0∈A
pρ(a0 |b).
Therefore (10) is equivalent to
∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b) = 1 · max
a0∈A
pρ(a0 |b) (11)
which itself is equivalent to
∀b ∈ B, ∀a ∈ Γb, pρ(a|b) = max
a0∈A
pρ(a0 |b).
Indeed, if there exists ai in Γb such that pρ(ai |b) <
maxa0∈A pρ(a0 |b) there is aj in Γb such that pρ(aj |b) >
maxa0∈A pρ(a0 |b) in order for (11) to holds; but this is
impossible.
The next result shows that an ω-accurate belief impacts
the vulnerability of A in presence of extra information by a
factor at least ω.
Lemma 6: If the adversary’s initial belief is ω-accurate
then
H∞(A : B) ≤ H∞(A| B) + log
 1
ω

Proof: By deﬁnition we have:
V(A : B) =
X
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A : b)
=
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
 1
|Γb|
X
a∈Γb
pρ(a|b)

(by hypotheses)
≥
X
b∈B
pρ(b)
 
ω · V(A|b)

≥ ω ·
X
b∈B
pρ(b)V(A|b)
≥ ω · V(A| B).
We can then establish our bounds on the initial uncertainty
as follows.
Theorem 1: Let A be a random variable and B be the
additional information about A. Then
H∞(A| B) ≤ H∞(A : B) ≤ H∞(A| B) + log
1
ζ

,
where ζ = minb∈B
  1
|Γb|
P
a∈Γb pρ(a|b)

/V(A|b).
Note that ζ in the above theorem is strictly greater than
zero since we consider admissible beliefs for some positive
. Hence the upper bound is well deﬁned.
Proof: From Lemma 10, Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4 we have
H∞(A| B) ≤ H∞(A : B).
The second part of the inequality follows from Lemma 6
and from the fact that the adversary’s belief is ζ-accurate.
Finally, we show that when A is uniformly distributed,
we can obtain a better upper bound. We begin by recalling
a result proven in [35].
Lemma 7: If A is uniformly distributed and the program
is deterministic then H∞(A|O) = log
 
|A|/|O|

.
Thus we have the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: If A is uniformly distributed and the actual
correlation pρ(b|a) is deterministic then
log
 |A|
|B|

≤ H∞(A : B) ≤ log
 |A|
|B|

+ log
1
ζ

,
where ζ is deﬁned as in the above theorem.
B. A posteriori belief-vulnerability
We now deﬁne our belief-vulnerability conditioned to the
low observations of the adversary. Note that in this case,
the adversary’s low observations could help her sort out
inaccurate beliefs. Indeed, if an observation o contradicts
her initial belief about extra information b, that is there is
no high input a in Γb such that pρ(o|a) > 0, then to try
values in Γb is pointless. A belief b is compatible (from the
adversary’s point of view) to an observation o, denoted bo,
if there exists a in Γb such that pρ(o|a) > 0. For instance,
if the adversary initially believes that A is an odd number
while observing a low output o of the program which is
only possible for even numbers high inputs, then her belief
and her observation are incompatible. Let o and b be the
adversary’s observation and initial belief respectively. She
will then only try values a in Γb for which pρ(o|a) > 0 if
her belief and observation are compatible. Otherwise, as the
evidence contradicts her belief, she will throw it away and
only use the observation.
Now let Γb,o denote the set possible adversary’s choices
according to both her belief and her low observation. Then
Γb,o =
(
argmaxa∈A pβ(a|b,o) if b  o,
argmaxa∈A pρ(a|o) otherwise.
Then we deﬁne the a posteriori belief-vulnerability as fol-
lows.Deﬁnition 7: Let A be the high input of a program, O its
low output and B the adversary’s initial belief about A. Then
the belief-vulnerability of A given O, denoted V(A|O : B),
is deﬁned as
V(A|O : B) =
X
o∈O
X
b∈B
pρ(b,o)V(A|o : b), (12)
where V(A|o : b) = 1
|Γb,o|
P
a∈Γb,o pρ(a|o,b).
We now show how to compute V(A|O : B) under
the assumption that the extra information B and the low
observable O are actually independent.
V(A|O : B) =
X
o∈O
pρ(b,o)V(A|o : b)
=
X
o∈O
X
b∈B
pρ(b,o)
 1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a|o,b)

=
X
o∈O
X
b∈B
1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a|o,b)pρ(b,o)
=
X
o∈O
X
b∈B
1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(o,b|a)pρ(a)
=
X
o∈O
X
b∈B
1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(b|a)pρ(o|a)pρ(a)
Thus we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Let A be the high input of a program, O
its low output and B the adversary’s extra information about
A. If O and B are independent, then
V(A|O : B) =
X
o∈O
X
b∈B
1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(b|a)pρ(o|a)pρ(a).
We then deﬁne our remaining uncertainty as follows.
Deﬁnition 8: Let A be the high input of a program, O its
low output and B the adversary’s initial belief about A. The
remaining uncertainty about A after observing O, denoted
H∞(A|O : B), is deﬁned as
H∞(A|O : B) = log
 1
V(A|O : B)

Example 4: Consider the following program, with A and
B as in Example 3, then O = {0,1,2}.
PROG C5:
BEGIN
O := b log(A + 1) c;
END
Both the program and the adversary’s assumed correlation
are deterministic, it is therefore easy to compute the adver-
sary’s belief conditional matrix pβ(a|o,b) and the associated
possible choices Γo,b. The result is shown in Table III. Thus
under the assumption that B and O are actually independent
pβ(a|o,b) a0 a1 a2 aa Γbk,oj
b0,o0 1 0 0 0 {a0}
b0,o1 0 0 1 0 {a2}
b0,o2 0 0 0 1 {a3}
b1,o0 1 0 0 0 {a0}
b1,o1 0 1 0 0 {a1}
b1,o2 0 0 0 1 {a3}
Table III
T ’ 
we have
V(A|O : B) =
X
b,o
1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(b|a)pρ(o|a)pρ(a)
=
1
4
X
b,o
1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(b|a)pρ(o|a)
=
1
4

pρ(b0 |a0)pρ(o0 |a0)
+ pρ(b0 |a2)pρ(o1 |a2)
+ pρ(b0 |a3)pρ(o2 |a3)
+ pρ(b1 |a0)pρ(o0 |a0)
+ pρ(b1 |a1)pρ(o1 |a1)
+ pρ(b1 |a3)pρ(o2 |a3)

=
1
4

pρ(b0 |a0) + pρ(b0 |a2)
+ pρ(b0 |a3) + pρ(b1 |a0)
+ pρ(b1 |a1) + pρ(b1 |a3)

=
1
4

(pρ(b0 |a0) + pρ(b1 |a0))
+ (pρ(b0 |a3) + pρ(b1 |a3))
+ pρ(b0 |a2) + pρ(b1 |a1)

=
1
4

2 + pρ(b0 |a2) + pρ(b1 |a1)

.
Hence V(A|O : B) ≥ 1
2, meaning that the remaining
uncertainty H∞(A|O : B) is always less than or equal
to 1 regardless the actual correlation between A and B.
Thus PROG C5 leaves the high value very vulnerable to be
guessed. Recall that the initial uncertainty H∞(A : B) (see
Example 3) can be arbitrary high when the accuracy of the
adversary’s belief is very low. This implies that a deliberate
reverting of the parity of the high value in order to confuse
the adversary is of very little use when the adversary can
see the output of PROG C5. Indeed, even if her initial belief
is wrong, the observation allows her to correct it. Table IV
summarises the remaining uncertainty for PROG C5 when
the actual correlation is ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3.
We now establish both a lower and an upper bound to
our remaining uncertainty. To this end, we establish some
auxiliary results.
We ﬁrst extend the notion of initial belief’s accuracy and
the partial order  to the adversary’s post-beliefs as follows.pρ(b | a) pρ1 pρ2 pρ3
V(A : B) 0.99 0.515 1
H∞(A : B) 0.0145 0.957 0
Table IV
R     
An adversary’s post-belief is (at least) ω-accurate if
∀o ∈ O, ∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a|o,b) ≥ ω · V(A|o,b).
Let O denote the partial order on Beliefs induced
by the observations O such that
 
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)

O  
p0
β(a), p0
β(b|a)

if and only if ∀o ∈ O, ∀b ∈ B,
1
|Γb,o|
X
a∈Γb,o
pρ(a|o,b) ≤
1
|Γ0
b,o|
X
a∈Γ0
b,o
pρ(a|o,b).
As in the previous subsection, we can show that a 1-
accurate post-belief is an information and that the remaining
uncertainty is a decreasing function of the accuracy of the
adversary post-belief.
Lemma 8: Let A be the high input of a program, O its
low output and B be an additional information about A. If
the adversary’s post-belief is 1-accurate then
H∞(A|O : B) = H∞(A| B,O).
Lemma 9:
 
pβ(a), pβ(b|a)

O
 
p0
β(a), p0
β(b|a)

implies H∞(A|O : B) ≥ H∞(A|O : B0).
We then establish the following bounds for the belief-
vulnerability based remaining uncertainty.
Theorem 2: Let A be a random variable, B be the addi-
tional information about A and O be the low output of the
program. Then
H∞(A|O, B) ≤ H∞(A|O : B) ≤ H∞(A|O, B) + log
1
η

,
where η = mino∈O, b∈B

1
|Γo,b|
P
a∈Γo,b pρ(a|o,)

/V(A|o,b).
Finally we have the following corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2: If A is uniformly distributed and both the
protocol and the actual correlation between A and B are
deterministic then
log
 |A|
|O| · |B|

≤ H∞(A|O : B) ≤ log
 |A|
|O| · |B|

+ log
1
η

.
We conclude this section by showing that in case of
belief’s absence (i.e., the initial knowledge of the adversary
is reduce to trivial information) then our deﬁnitions are
equivalent to the vulnerability-based deﬁnitions of Smith.
Theorem 3: The following statements are equivalent.
1) |B| = 1 and the a priori probability of A is publicly-
known.
2) For each adversary’s initial belief
 
pρ(a), pρ(b|a)

in
Beliefs(A, B) and for each program pρ(o|a) we have
V(A : B) = V(A) and V(A|O : B) = V(A|O).
3) For each adversary’s initial belief
 
pρ(a), pρ(b|a)

in
Beliefs(A, B) and for each program pρ(o|a) we have
H∞(A| B) = H∞(A) and H∞(A|O : B) = H∞(A|O).
Proof: (1) ⇒ (2): |B| = 1 implies that B is a constant.
Hence B is independent of both A and O. Furthermore, the
only possible adversary’s belief, which is the publicly-known
a priori distribution of A, is 1-accurate. Thus V(A : B) =
V(A| B). But V(A| B) = V(A) since A and B are independent.
Similarly, V(A|O : B) = V(A|O).
(2) ⇒ (1): (By contradiction). Assume that (2) holds and
|B| > 1 or the adversary does not know the a priori
distribution of A. Let ﬁrst consider the case |B| > 1. Then
we can create an adversary’s belief which is exactly ω-
accurate for any 0 < ω < 1. Thus for such belief we
have V(A : B) = ω · V(A| B). Therefore if we choose
ω , V(A)/V(A| B), then V(A : B) , V(A). Hence, it
contradicts our initial hypotheses that (2) holds.
Now assume that |B| = 1 but the adversary does not know
the a priori distribution of A. Again B is a constant and thus
irrelevant. If A is not uniformly distributed then it is easy
to construct an adversary’s assumed a priori distribution of
A such that V(A : B) , V(A| B) = V(A). If however A
is uniformly distributed then we can still create a program
such that V(A|O : B) , V(A|O, B) = V(A|O). Again, this
contradicts our initial hypotheses that (2) holds.
Finally, the equivalence (2) ⇔ (3) follows because func-
tions g(x) = −log(x) and g0(x) = 2−x are strictly monotone.
V. O  A   B-
A
The previous section establishes the reasonableness of our
deﬁnitions in terms of their theoretical properties. Now we
show the utility of our approach by applying it to various
threat scenarios and comparing the results to the previous
approaches.
We proceed now to the analysis of the programs pre-
sented in this paper, and compare the results with previous
approaches. Each of the programs is analysed under the
following hypothesis.
• The high input A is uniform and publicly-known. Thus
∀a ∈ A pρ(a) = pβ(a) =
1
|A|
.
• The adversary believes that her extra info is accurate,
that is she assumes the correlation shown in Table V.
Thus Γ0 = {0,2} and Γ1 = {1,3}.
• The real correlation between A and B is of the form of
the matrix shown in Table V. It is easy to see that the
adversary’s initial belief is therefore ω-accurate.
• B and O are independent.pβ(b | a) b0 b1
a0 1 0
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
a3 0 1
pρ(b | a) b0 b1
a0
ω
1+ω
1
1+ω
a1
1
1+ω
ω
1+ω
a2
ω
1+ω
1
1+ω
a3
1
1+ω
ω
1+ω
Table V
C 
We denote by IUx the initial uncertainty computed us-
ing approach x ∈ {c,v,bv} where c,v and bv denote the
consensus, vulnerability and belief-vulnerability approaches
respectively. Ditto for RUx and ILx.
We begin by PROG C1 of Example 1. Since A is uniformly
distributed then IUc = IUv = log|A| = 2. Furthermore,
RUv = log
 
|A|/|O|

= log 4
2 = 1 = RUc since PROG C1
is deterministic. Thus, when we do not take into account
the attacker’s belief, then ILc = ILv = 1. Now let consider
the uniformly ω-accurate attacker’s belief. Then from the
calculation in Example 3 we have IUbv = −log
  ω
2(1+ω)

. And
from Proposition 3, we get RUbv = −log
  ω
1+ω

. Therefore for
all ω, ILbv = 1. Thus, the adversary’s initial knowledge about
the parity of A does not aﬀect the quantity of information
leaked by PROG C1. However, the real question is not how
much information is leaked by this program, but what the
remaining uncertainty represents in term of security threat
to the high input. Even though the adversary’s belief does
not aﬀect the quantity of information leaked, it dramatically
aﬀects both the initial and remaining uncertainty. Indeed,
as illustrated by Figure 1, both IUbv and RUbv tend toward
inﬁnity as ω tends toward zero. On the other hand, IUbv
and RUbv tend toward two and one, respectively, as ω tends
toward one. In other words inaccurate beliefs strengthen
the security of the program (by confusing the adversary),
whilst accurate beliefs may weaken it. Thus, a deliberate
randomization of the parity of the high input in order to
confuse the adversary is a good strategy to strengthen the
security of this program.
We continue our analysis with PROG C5 of Example 4
which is a slight modiﬁcation of PROG C1. Again IUc =
IUv = log|A| = 2 and IUbv = −log
  ω
2(1+ω)

. For the remain-
ing uncertainty we have RUc = 0.585, RUv = 0.415 and
RUbv = −log
  2ω+1
2(1+ω)

. Therefore, ILc = 1.415, ILv = 1.585
and ILbv = log
 2ω+1
ω

. The information ﬂow ascribed by
our approach to this program is illustrated by Figure 2.
Unlike PROG C1, the information leakage of this program
can be arbitrary high when the inaccuracy of the adversary’s
belief is high whilst its remaining uncertainty RUbv remains
very low even for inaccurate beliefs. As already noticed in
Example 4, this program leaves A highly vulnerable of being
guessed and a deliberate padding of A in order to confuse
the adversary is of little help. Note however that RUbv tends
toward one, which is higher than both RUc and RUv, as ω
Figure 1. Information ﬂow of PROG C1
Figure 2. Information ﬂow of PROG C5
tends toward zero. It means that highly inaccurate beliefs
slightly strengthen the security of PROG C5.
We proceed with the probabilistic program PROG C2
(see Example 1). Again IUc = IUv = log|A| = 2 and
IUbv = −log
  ω
2(1+ω)

. For the remaining uncertainty, we
have RUv = 1, RUc = 1
4
 
3log3 − log

(1 − λ)(1−λ)λλ
and
RUbv = −log
  1
4 + ω
ω+1
1
4 + 1
4 max(λ,1−λ)

. The information
ﬂow ascribed by the consensus deﬁnitions is illustrated in
Figure 3 and those of the belief-vulnerability approach in
Figures 4 and 5. We ﬁrst note that in the case of belief’s ab-Figure 3. Shannon entropy-based information ﬂow of PROG C2
sence, our approach –which coincides with the vulnerability
one– ascribes the same information ﬂow quantities to both
PROG C2 and PROG C1, even though they seem to present
rather diﬀerent threats.1 The reason is simply that after her
low observation, the adversary needs on average 21 tries to
guess the value of A for both programs. We also note that
the randomisation parameter λ of PROG C2 has no eﬀect on
the vulnerability approach, and has only a little one on ours
when the accuracy of the adversary’s beliefs tends to 1 and
λ to 1
2. This is due to the fact that these metrics focus on
the single probability that brings greatest risk and values 0
and 2 of A play symmetric roles with respect to λ. Finally,
comparing Figures 4 and 5 to Figure 1, our approach allows
us to assert that the security performance of PROG C1 is
better than those of PROG C2, except for highly accurate
beliefs. Indeed, the remaining uncertainty of PROG C2 is
always less than or equal to 2 whilst those of PROG C1 can
be arbitrary high for highly inaccurate beliefs. In fact, we
have the following result relating the security performance
of these programs, the randomisation parameter λ, and the
accuracy of the adversary’s beliefs.
Proposition 4: The security performance of PROG C1 is
better than those of PROG C2 if and only if the randomisation
parameter λ of PROG C2 and the accuracy of the adversary’s
beliefs ω satisfy the following relation.
ω ≤
1
3 − max(λ,1 − λ)
The few elementary examples above illustrate the ap-
plicability of our metric to various threats scenarios. In
1See the discussion on the last paragraph of page 298 of [35].
Figure 4. RUbv of PROG C2
Figure 5. ILbv of PROG C2
particular, when it is unavoidable for the attacker to initially
have access to some (potentially inaccurate) information
about the high input, our approach allows to establish the
adversary’s beliefs accuracy limit that is tolerable given a
speciﬁc program. For instance, adversary’s beliefs which are
less than or equal to 50% accurate are tolerable for PROG
C1, since they happen to confuse the adversary instead of
helping her. Furthermore, given a collection of programs
with the same security objective, we can design a more
complex program that adapts dynamically to the context of
the adversary, when the accuracy of her beliefs changes. Forexample, proposition 4 tells us that it is more secure to use
PROG C1 that PROG C2 in a context where one can assume
that the accuracy of the initial information of the adversary
is less than two-ﬁfth; on the other hand, the contrary holds
for higher accurate beliefs.
VI. C
This paper presents a new approach to quantitative infor-
mation ﬂow that incorporates the attacker’s beliefs in the
model on R´ enyi min entropy. We investigate the impact
of such adversary’s extra knowledge on the security of the
secret information. Our analysis reveals that inaccurate extra
information tends to confuse the adversary by increasing her
uncertainty about the hidden secret while accurate informa-
tion may increase dramatically its vulnerability. We have
shown the strength of our deﬁnitions both in terms of their
theoretical properties and of their utility by applying them to
various threat scenarios, and we have compared our results
to the previous approaches. Our model allows to identify
the levels of accuracy for the adversary’s beliefs which are
compatible with the security of a given program or protocol.
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